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THE EFFECTS OF DEREGULATION 
ON LONDON'S FINANCIAL 
MARKETPLACE 
Gail N. Eskuchen 
Introduction 
The old-fashioned, quiet, and reserved 
City of London (the financial district within 
London) is now only a part of history. The 
deregulatory changes made in response to the 
worldwide trend towards international com-
petition among securities markets have dras-
tically updated the City. In fact, the changes 
have been referred to by many as "the incipi-
ent Americanization of the City of London" 
(Campbell, p. 57). 
The City, along with New York and Tokyo, 
has historically been regarded as one of the top 
three financial marketplaces in the world. 
However, a sweeping global movement to-
wards an international marketplace during the 
1970s and the 1980s has raised concerns that 
the City would fail to keep pace with other 
financial centers. Therefore, changes in the 
way the City did its business were considered 
necessary so that it could maintain its world-
wide status. 
During the period from 1979 to 1986, 
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dramatic deregulatory changes took place in 
the City in an effort to1 maintain its com-
petitiveness in the global marketplace. It 
appears that the deregulatory measures taken 
will indeed be effective in enabling the City to 
maintain its position as one of the world's most 
important international financial market-
places. 
This article discusses in detail the reasons 
why deregulatory changes were necessary in 
the City. It also examines the deregulatory 
measures that were instituted, and analyzes 
the effects of these deregulatory changes. 
Background 
The City's Position Before 
Deregulation 
During the nineteenth century, the City 
was the world's center for financial transac-
tions, backed as it was by Britain's empire and 
its stable monetary system. Mter World War I, 
however, the U.S. emerged in far healthier con-
dition than any of the War's European par-
ticipants. Although the City maintained its 
stature as a marketplace for Eurocurrencies, 
Eurobonds, and gold bullion dealing, its in-
fluence in other securities markets dwindled 
(Mason, p. 179). 
However, over the last several decades, 
the City regained its strength and again be-
came recognized as a sound, competitive mar-
ketplace. Its size, in terms of domestic market 
turnover, became exceeded only by New York 
and Tokyo (Mason, p. 161). Unlike these two 
cities, however, the City of London boasted a 
greater degree of dealing sophistication, one 
that evolved through centuries of tradition. For 
example, London was the undisputed center of 
worldwide bank lending because bankers from 
other countries found that its skills, location, 
and facilities made it a better place to conduct 
business than their own countries. Through its 
years of experience in international trade, Lon-
don became highly skilled in handling inter-
national currencies. Furthermore, the City's 
location midway between New York and Tokyo 
in terms of international time zones enabled it 
to form a link between the two other financial 
centers. Finally, the expansive resource fa-
cilities which have developed in London over 
the years, as well as the highly-esteemed Euro-
analysts (researchers who analyze foreign com-
panies) employed there, helped the City be-
come regarded as an invaluable center for 
international financial information. 
London has remained the dominant mar-
ketplace for international transactions in gold 
bullion, Eurocurrencies and Eurobonds. Fur-
thermore, the City's regulatory structure was 
to become favored by financial institutions, 
because the structure restricted entry and con-
trolled competition. 
However, during the 1970s, a period of 
financial global deregulation emerged. This 
worldwide movement, which came to threaten 
London's competitiveness as an international 
financial marketplace, is discussed in the 
following sections. 
Global Deregulation 
The deregulatory movement of the 1970s 
was stimulated by three factors: 1) inflationary 
pressures, 2) the loosening of international 
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exchange controls, and 3) the impact of in-
creased computerization. These factors will 
now be examined. 
The Role of Inflation 
In the 1970s, growing inflation in most 
industrialized nations stimulated the develop-
ment of financial investment alternatives. In 
some countries, new investment alternatives 
were developed which skirted government reg-
ulation, enabling customers to earn higher 
returns. In other countries, governments cre-
ated more financial instruments to raise funds 
and reduce their international debt. However, 
these new alternatives caused more problems, 
as they diverted funds from banking systems, 
causing shortages of funds and disintermedia-
tion crises. These problems, in tum, prompted 
deregulation within each country, thereby cre-
ating a period of deregulation throughout 
the world. 
The phenomenon can best be understood 
by examining the changes that took place in 
Japan, since this country provides a clear 
example of the pattern of events described 
above. Therefore, a brief digression to examine 
Japan's deregulatory changes is in order. 
Early in the 1970s, Japan's highly-regu-
lated financial structure allowed very few fi-
nancial instruments to be traded. However, 
following the first oil shock of 1973, inflation 
accelerated and, in tum, government deficits 
grew. As a result, the government required a 
number of banks and securities firms to accept 
newly issued government debt instruments at 
below-market rates, to hold them for a specified 
period, and then to resell them. Thus, a secon-
dary market for long-term government bonds 
developed. Since trading in the secondary mar-
kets was highly restricted, the government was 
forced to begin a progressive easing of restric-
tions imposed on their secondary sales. As 
Japan's secondary market developed and the 
demand by individuals for higher returns on 
investments grew, Japanese banks experienced 
disintermediation. The government was con-
sequently forced to deregulate; it began to 
allow banks to issue negotiable certificates of 
deposit. Additionally, interest rate ceilings 
were eliminated on these deposits. 
These changes in financial structure 
sparked the beginning of a wealth of further 
deregulation in Japan. Although the financial 
system still remains in a web of bureaucracy to 
a certain extent, deregulation has allowed 
Tokyo to establish itself as an internationally 
respected financial center. 
Granted, the impact of inflation in other 
countries did not produce effects as dramatic as 
those in Japan. Nonetheless, inflationary pres-
sures in other countries (such as the United 
States and France) stimulated similar patterns 
of events, thus producing an era of global de-
regulation which opened the world's financial 
markets for international trade. 
The Impact of Exchange 
Controls 
In addition to the deregulation prompted 
by inflation within most industrialized coun-
tries, the elimination or relaxation of exchange 
controls by 1980 facilitated the development of 
an integrated world financial market. Exchange 
controls were initially imposed by many coun-
tries to control excessive capital flows into 
strong deutsche marks and yen from 1973-
1978. However, in anticipation of a strength-
ened dollar in 1979, the exchange controls 
were lifted, allowing U.S. currency to flow 
freely on a global basis. Therefore, the deregu-
lation of these controls fostered the mobility of 
international capital and the resulting integra-
tion of the world's markets. 
The Role of Technology 
The third factor that hastened the devel-
opment of a global marketplace was the impact 
of computer technology. Computers have sub-
stantially improved transaction processing, 
and have given institutions the ability to han-
dle a tremendous number of transactions more 
inexpensively and rapidly than ever before. 
Additionally, computers have provided for the 
rapid and economical dissemination of infor-
mation both within and between marketplaces. 
Fax machines and telex telephone systems are 
only two examples of computerized communi-
cation systems which have greatly speeded 
communication between the world's financial 
markets. 
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Some observers estimate that the costs of 
international information transmission have 
been lowered by 98% over the last two decades 
(Goodhart, p. 7). Without these technological 
advances, the development of a world capital 
marketplace would have proceeded much more 
slowly than it did. 
Deregulation in London 
As a result of the factors discussed above, 
global deregulation had brought sweeping 
changes to the world's financial marketplaces 
by 1980. London, however, was only a minor 
participant in this deregulatory movement. 
Granted, a deregulatory inroad was made in 
1979 when exchange controls were abolished, 
allowing non-U.K. residents to freely enter 
London's currency market and repatriate pre-
viously invested funds without restriction 
(Mason, p.180). However, many other competi-
tive restrictions and procedural inefficiencies 
remained, which limited the City's po-
tential as an international marketplace. 
Exchange membership was restricted, fixed 
minimum commissions persisted, and meth-
ods of conducting transactions were ineffi-
cient. All three of these areas needed to be 
improved if London was to remain globally 
competitive. 
To remedy London's persisting problems, 
many deregulatory changes were instituted 
between 1983 and 1986. First, a 1983 settle-
ment concerning the Restrictive Practices Act 
eliminated the Stock Exchange's rule book 
and provided for the elimination of fixed com-
missions on securities transactions by 1986. 
Second, in 1984 minimum commissions on 
"gilts" (London's term for government securi-
ties) were reduced, and commissions involving 
overseas securities were made negotiable. 
Third, banks and building societies (similar to 
U.S. savings-and-loan institutions) were put 
on equal footing with respect to tax treatment 
and government regulation in 1985, and the 
British government initiated a movement to-
wards a new corporate debt market. Finally, a 
complex collection of deregulatory changes 
dubbed the "Big Bang" was instituted in 1986. 
Each of these deregulatory measures are dis-
cussed in the following sections. 
The Abolition of the Restrictive 
Practices Act 
In 1983, a landmark out-of-court settle-
ment was struck between Sir Nicholas Goodison, 
the Chairman of the Stock Exchange, and Cecil 
Parkinson, the Secretary of the State for Trade 
and Industry. The case was initiated in 1978, 
when Roy Hattersley, then the Labor Industry 
Minister, decided to challenge the Stock Ex-
change's rule book. According to Riley, since 
the rule book controlled the types of business 
that could be transacted and the rates of com-
mission that could be charged, it perpetuated 
the pattern of relatively small, weakly-capital-
ized firms to the exclusion of outsiders and 
significant international links. 
Mter five years of litigation, a settlement 
was reached that exempted the Stock Exchange 
from the Restrictive Practices Act, the act en-
forcing the Stock Exchange's rule book. There-
fore, by eliminating this restrictive rule book, 
the groundwork was laid for allowing the mar-
ket to become more competitive. 
An additional provision to this agreement 
was the abolition of fixed commissions on se-
curities transactions by 1986. This provision 
was prompted by the 1979 lifting of exchange 
controls previously discussed. When the con-
trols were lifted, U.K. investors gained the ex-
perience of transacting in markets much more 
competitive than London's. Furthermore, the 
type of investors who used the market changed 
dramatically, as small, private investors grad-
ually gave way to large institutions, whose pro-
fessional fund managers had a much-less-
generous idea of how much they ought to be 
paying in commissions. 
Faced with this provision concerning the 
abolition of fixed commissions in the out-of-
court discussions, the Stock Exchange decided 
that it would be better to decontrol com-
missions rather than face the alternative of an 
enforced court order. The Exchange knew that 
the enforcement provisions of its regulatory 
bodies were not effective, since the enforce-
ment procedures were usually based on the use 
of persuasion rather than court proceedings. 
Realizing that some brokers were already giv-
ing discounts to their major institutional cus-
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tomers in spite of the existing restrictions, the 
Stock Exchange accepted the provision. To 
avoid any legal confrontation concerning its 
regulatory system, the Exchange thus pre-
ferred to devise positive measures to deal with 
the new situation. 
The fixed commissions had made it possi-
ble for many small undercapitalized firms to 
sutvive. The prospective reduction in income 
which would result from the elimination of 
fixed commissions meant now that these firms 
would have to have established reputations, 
proven expertise in broker's market-making 
and order-execution abilities, and high quality 
research capabilities. In essence, elimination 
of fixed commissions increased competition to 
such a degree that only strong, efficient firms 
would be able to sutvive in the marketplace. 
The Deregulatory Measures of 1984 
and 1985 
On April 9, 1984, two additional changes 
were instituted. First, reductions were made in 
the level of minimum commissions on dealings 
in gilt edged stocks or "gilts." This change 
brought about a substantial decline in com-
missions, as much as 20% for large institu-
tional investors. The reduction in gilt com-
missions had much the same effect as the 
elimination of securities commissions in 1986: 
a much more competitive and efficient mar-
ketplace. 
Also on this date it became permissible to 
negotiate commissions on transactions involv-
ing overseas securities- a change which would 
make the market much more competitive in-
ternationally. This was so because investors 
already conducting U.K. securities transac-
tions with London brokers would now be more 
likely to also conduct overseas securities busi-
ness with them, instead of taking their transac-
tions to less expensive brokers overseas. 
Two major changes affecting banking and 
corporate debt were also instituted in 1985. 
First, regulatory revisions were made allowing 
all banks and building societies to compete in 
an environment of equal tax treatment and 
legal restrictions. Before 1979, the banking 
system in Britain was subdivided into two enti-
ties, banks and building societies. Building 
societies possessed a substantial advantage 
over banks in competing for retail savings de-
posits in that the interest paid on consumers' 
deposits in building societies had certain tax 
advantages. Additionally, building societies 
dominated the mortgage lending market be-
cause of various legal restrictions. Therefore, 
banks tended to lend only to their prime 
customers. 
However, regulations were lifted in 1979 
and 1980, thus enabling banks to circumvent 
the restrictions and enter the mortgage mar-
ket. Finally, in 1985, the authorities har-
monized the tax treatment of banks and 
building societies, thereby eliminating the ad-
vantages which the building societies enjoyed. 
The resulting equal treatment of banks and 
building societies has fostered more competi-
tion, which has in tum improved service to 
customers. 
Also in 1985, the British Governmental-
lowed the issuance of one-to-five-year sterling 
corporate debt issues (corporate bonds). This 
action is seen as a precursor to the develop-
ment of an extensive commercial paper market 
in London. Allowing the development of new 
financial instruments and possibly an entire 
new market in London enhances the attrac-
tiveness of investment in the City to overseas 
investors by giving them more financial invest-
ment alternatives. Therefore, the development 
of the corporate debt issues will make the City 
even more competitive internationally. 
Deregulation in 1986 
The majority of the deregulatory meas-
ures in London occurred in 1986. Besides the 
elimination of fixed minimum commissions 
brought about by the 1983 out-of-court settle-
ment, the following measures were instituted 
to increase market competitiveness: 
1. the distinctions between brokers and 
jobbers were eliminated; 
2. regulations governing membership of 
the Stock Exchange were relaxed; 
3. a computerized trading system was set 
up; 
4. limits concerning shareholders' rights 
were relaxed; 
5. the number of firms dealing in gilts 
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was greatly increased; and 
6. the regulatory structure of the market-
place was reformed. 
Each of these changes will now be dis-
cussed. 
Broker-Jobber Distinctions 
On October 27, 1986, the "Big Bang" took 
place in London. The effects of the Big Bang 
were to eliminate all fixed commissions on 
securities, as previously discussed, and to elim-
inate all of the regulations which differentiated 
"brokers" and "jobbers." 
Unlike the U.S., the London Stock Ex-
change had a system of "single capacity." This 
meant that a broker could act as an agent for a 
client only by taking orders, but could not 
trade for his own account. A broker had to pass 
his orders on to a jobber, whose role was much 
like that of a floor specialist in the U.S.- i.e., 
"making a market" and quoting two prices, a 
"bid" and an "ask." In essence, a broker could 
not "make a market" in a security, while a job-
ber could not deal with the public; in this re-
spect, each functioned in a "single capacity." 
However, on October 27 these differences 
were eliminated. Brokers and jobbers were now 
allowed to perform both sales and trading func-
tions in a "dual capacity." It was inevitable that 
the system of single capacity would be abol-
ished when fixed commissions were elimi-
nated. The reason is that if broker commissions 
were reduced, brokers would be forced to aug-
ment their incomes by trading on their own 
accounts. Also, because of the increasing inter-
nationalization of global marketplaces, it was 
necessary to expand the capacity of major brok-
ers for them to compete globally. 
Relaxation of Exchange 
Membership Regulations 
Several of the Stock Exchange's mem-
bership regulations were relaxed in 1986. 
Under the new provisions, both foreign and 
domestic corporations, as well as domestic 
banks, were allowed to become members of the 
Stock Exchange. Furthermore, foreign firms 
were also allowed to acquire 100% of a Stock 
Exchange member firm. The previous limit was 
29.9% (Mason, p. 180). 
Joining the Exchange offers several ad-
vantages. First of all, membership gives com-
panies access to otherwise unattainable flows 
of information. Second, trades by recognized 
brokers are exempt from certain taxes. Third, 
membership is desirable because only Exchange 
members can deal in gilts. Finally, only mem-
bers of the Stock Exchange have voting 
rights. 
The new membership privileges have al-
lowed an array of global financial giants, in-
cludingAmerican Express, Barclays Bank PLC, 
and Union Bank of Switzerland, to take full 
ownership of exchange firms in which they 
already hold minority stakes (Putka, Truell, 
and Winkler, p. 1). The fact that commercial 
banks in the U.S. or Japan are not permitted to 
facilitate securities transactions was expected 
to further increase London's International 
influence. 
The Effects of Computerized 
Trading 
Before the Big Bang, trading in the Lon-
don securities market consisted of traditional 
face-to-face dealing in a central marketplace, 
much like that in the New York Stock Ex-
change. However, on October 27, a com-
puterized market-maker system called the 
Stock Exchange Automated Quotation System 
(SEAQ) was instituted, eliminating traditional 
trading in the City. 
The new system was designed to function 
like the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers Automated Quotations system (NASDAQ) 
in the U.S. The information presented on com-
puter screens is updated continuously and 
transactions occur instantaneously (with the 
exception of extraordinarily large transac-
tions). The SEAQ is equipped to handle 60,000 
transactions per day, a substantial increase 
from the pre-Big Bang average of 27,000 per 
day (Putka, Truell, and Winkler, p.ll). The sys-
tem has proven to be reliable, since the trading 
systems "coped remarkably well" during the 
week of the October 1987 market crash (Wall 
Street Journal, February 11, 1988). As a result of 
the institution of SEAQ, trading is now han-
dled in firms' electronic dealing rooms, with 
price quotations displayed on computer screens 
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and trades struck by telephone. 
The computerized system has proven to 
be advantageous to brokers, because it helps 
them to cope with the increase in transaction 
volume that resulted from the elimination of 
fixed commissions. The system also provides 
more information to brokers, since the screens 
give stock buyers the advantage of seeing all 
the prices offered on a certain company's shares 
by competing market makers. 
Changes in Shareholders' 
Rights 
Two important changes regarding share-
holders' rights were instituted in 1986. First, 
limits on the number of shares in a particular 
company that another firm can hold were elim-
inated. This means that large institutions are 
now able to purchase more financial instru-
ments in the City, instead of having their pur-
chasing power limited. 
Also, rules governing shareholders' rights 
to first refusal of new issuances were relaxed. 
Initially, the rules were similar to the United 
States' preemptive-right provisions included 
in the by-laws of a corporation. These provi.-
sions, which are optional for each U.S. corpora-
tion, allow shareholders the right of first re-
fusal so that they may maintain their relative 
interest in the company. In the City, these pro-
visions were not optional for each corporation, 
but were required by law. The relaxation of 
these laws implies that higher demand for new 
issues of stock will increase competition in this 
area. 
Increased Membership in the 
Gilts Market 
Before the Big Bang, only a dozen spe-
cialist stockbrokers had conducted institu-
tional business in gilts. This system was known 
for discouraging competition and encouraging 
"cozily high" commissions (Smith, p. 13). In its 
place, an almost exact copy of the American 
government securities market was introduced, 
creating positions for an additional twenty-
eight primary dealers. This allowance for in-
creased participation was expected to reduce 
commission rates by 25% to 35% and to result 
in increased volume. 
Restructuring of the Regulatory 
System 
Prior to the Big Bang, an inefficient regu-
latory structure plagued the City's market-
places. This structure was developed during 
the early years of this century, when the au-
thorities (primarily the Bank of England) 
sought to allay concerns about investor protec-
tion and the stability of the financial system. 
The Bank proceeded to formalize the separa-
tion of various financial services into distinct 
compartments, and encouraged the creation of 
self-regulating organizations within each com-
partment. The function of these organizations, 
which became known as "clubs," was to over-
see the behavior of the firms participating in 
the market and to provide a channel of com-
munication between the firms and the au-
thorities. 
Although these clubs offered many advan-
tages, the arrangement soon became a high 
cost and inefficient one because resources 
were duplicated among the many self-regulat-
ing organizations. Furthermore, the clubs 
proved to be highly ineffective in new product 
development and in the introduction of new 
technologies. For this reason, many fringe in-
stitutions developed in efforts to circumvent 
the restrictions of the clubs. Since these fringe 
institutions began to offer certain services 
(such as reduced commissions and volume dis-
counts on transactions) barred by the rules to 
club members, it became even more apparent 
that regulatory change was necessary. 
In November, 1986, the Financial Serv-
ices Act instituted a new regulatory structure 
concerning all facets of the U.K. investment 
business. This act set up general principles of 
investor protection, which are in tum inter-
preted by the Securities and Investments 
Board (SIB). The board oversees five different 
Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs), which 
adapt and refine the rules of the Act to make 
them applicable to the market they are regulat-
ing. It is hoped that this new structure, while 
overcoming previous constraints and ineffi-
ciencies, will improve investment regulation in 
the City, thereby making investors feel more 
safe in conducting transactions there. 
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The Effects of Deregulation 
It has been noted by Leigh Pemberton, the 
Governor of the Bank of England, that "busi-
ness likely will gravitate towards the (financial) 
centers offering the lowest transactions costs, 
the most liquid markets, the widest range of 
financial instruments and services, and the 
surest settlement and communication sys-
tems" (Putka, et al., p.11).It was hoped that the 
changes instituted in the City from 1983 to 
1986 would make the City highly competitive 
in these respects. 
The City has indeed become more com-
petitive since the deregulatory changes were 
made. The measures instituted have created a 
new era of international competition within 
the City. For example, 40-50% of the U.K. se-
curities industry is now under foreign control. 
All of the City's major brokers and most of the 
City's jobbers- formerly independent- are now 
under the control of either foreign or British 
companies. Sixty of the 220 Stock Exchange 
members have been acquired, so that the City's 
most prestigious names are now owned by for-
eign institutions. 
American firms have become considerably 
more active in the London market, such as 
Citicorp, Merrill Lynch, Salomon Brothers, 
and Prudential-Bache, to name just a few. 
Many European banks have also become more 
involved, including Credit Suisse, Union Bank 
of Switzerland, and Credit Commercial de 
France. Japanese firms such as Nomura Se-
curities and Daiwa Securities have also in-
creased their presence in the market. Finally, 
many British banks have become active in the 
investment business. Most notable among these 
are National Westminster Bank, Barclays Bank, 
Midland Bank, and Lloyds of London. 
With the increase in the number of market 
participants, London's trading in foreign shares 
has surged. For example, a 1987 estimate in-
dicated that London is doing 50 percent more 
business in foreign stocks than the NYSE and 
the U.S. over-the-counter markets combined. 
Trading has moved to the City from Sweden, 
Germany and other European countries in order 
to avoid high transfer taxes and/ or commis-
sions in these countries. According to Phillip 
Gray, international investment manager at G.T. 
Management in London, the trades are moving 
to London because it is increasingly seen as a 
better capitalized, more efficient market. Fur-
thermore, according to David Head, the chief 
international trader at Shearson Lehman-
Hutton (London), customers are going to Lon-
don "because it is cheaper. It's as simple as 
that" (Putka, April 3, 1987). 
The End Result 
What will be the end result of the sweep-
ing movement towards participation in secu-
rities transactions in the City? The primary 
underlying motivation of market participants 
at present is simple-survival. Each firm is 
working with a goal of strength through effi-
ciency and capital, so that it will not need to 
merge-or, worse, be acquired-to be com-
petitive. 
To be able to survive, however, firms must 
ensure that the demands of their customers are 
met. What are the needs of the clients of finan-
cial services firms? Most cutomers are interest-
ed in four aspects of financial service. First of 
all, clients demand access to a variety of invest-
ment alternatives. Second, they want to be fur-
nished with timely and accurate information 
and advice about investment alternatives, so 
they can make sound investment decisions. 
Third, customers wish to have their transac-
tions processed quickly. Institutional inves-
tors especially realize that exercising trans-
actions rapidly can mean the difference be-
tween gains or losses of millions of dollars. 
Finally, investors desire low fees. They want to 
pay as little as possible for the services provided 
to them by investment firms. 
In the future, then, only those firms which 
can service their customers according to these 
requirements will survive. Many firms at pres-
ent are becoming increasingly aware of this as 
they merge and acquire new firms. For exam-
ple, foreign firms are merging with companies 
which already have expertise in dealing with 
clients in London. They are also acquiring 
small "market-niche" firms with expertise in 
specialized financial areas. 
So when the pace of mergers and acqui-
sitions slows, the result will be a small number 
of one-stop "financial supermarket" business-
es which can conduct transactions effectively 
and efficiently in the City, while they provide 
customers with the diversity of services de-
manded. And as a result, the City, composed of 
an industry of financial giants, will remain one 
of the most competitive financial marketplaces 
in the world. 
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